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Chapter 1
The
history of Anglo-US relations up to the Casablanca conference can be split into two
distinct phases. The first starts with the beginning of WW2 in September of 1939, and ends
with the American declaration of war in December 1941. Churchill described this episode as
'How the British people held the fort alone, till those who hitherto had been half
blind were half ready.' (1) The second begins with
America's entry into hostilities, and continues up until the SYMBOL conference in
Casablanca, from the 14th to the 24th of January 1943, and beyond.
The relationship during these two different periods was bound to be different, for as
Churchill famously said when someone suggested that Britain continue the same cautious
approach toward America she has used before Pearl Harbour: "Oh! That is the way we
talked to her while we were wooing her; now that she in the harem, we talk to her quite
differently!! (2)
US neutrality was, from the beginning of war,
strongly weighted in favour of assisting Britain. This was especially true after the shock
caused by the fall of France in 1940, which left Britain facing Germany alone. FDR's
reelection for an unprecedented third term in 1940 made him more politically secure, and
he subsequently felt that he could begin to offer more concrete assistance to the British.
However, by the time the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, America was
still dragging her heels. While in the North Atlantic the US Navy was operating a state of
undeclared war against Germany, American policy was still cautious. What concessions there
were had been relatively small: military missions and staff talks, including the
affirmation of 'Germany First'; the first meeting between the two leaders and
the signing of the Atlantic Charter, arguably a vague and useless document in the context
of a war far from being won, and of course Lend-Lease, inspired by FDR's vision of
America becoming the 'arsenal of democracy.' (3)
Although initially Lend-Lease supplies were slow to come, they eventually covered half the
UK's balance of payments. Lend-Lease became a truly effective method for supply, as
American industry tooled up for the mass production that was required to win the war.
Hitler invaded the USSR in June 1941, initially making rapid
gains. The German military was now fully committed to a major land campaign, making it
extremely unlikely that Britain would be invaded. Churchill allied with Stalin in 1942,
pledging material support. This meant that a new ally needed to be supplied, leading to
Churchill's initiation of costly Arctic convoys. The turning point in Hitler's
war was to occur on the Russian front not long before Casablanca: the battle of
Stalingrad. In November 1942 the German 6th Army, which had captured the city,
was trapped by a daring Soviet encirclement, creating a pocket containing 250,000 German
troops. German force of arms was demonstrated to be susceptible to massive defeat, and
Hitler's strategic thinking was shown to be fallible by Stalingrad; more importantly,
the strategic advantage was permanently ceded to Stalin on the Russian front, although he
continued to call for a Second Front in Europe.
War in North Africa began in June 1940, with some spectacular
British victories against the Italians; subsequently, however, Rommel came close to taking
Egypt and the Suez Canal. It is vital to appreciate the while there was a huge difference
in scale between BARBAROSSA and the Western Desert Campaign, the desert was the only place
the British army was engaging German troops. As the only active Allied land theatre,
protecting the Suez Canal, it loomed large in British strategic calculations. The TORCH
landings in North Africa, in November 1942 were a response to the glimmer of hope offered
by the Western Desert Campaign; Churchill at the June 1942 Washington Conference had
suggested them to FDR, and in the absence of viable options for a true Second Front, FDR
had agreed. The Second Front, the term given to a major invasion of the continent by the
Allies, was to continue to dominate the agenda in 1943. TORCH, an operation involving
British, American and Free French troops, effectively secured the whole of Africa and the
Middle East for the Allies (hence the feasibility of meeting at Casablanca in the first
place), although Rommel was reinforced in Tunisia, where he put up impressive resistance
until May 1943. The product of a marriage between a British strategy and American
resources, which ruled out any attempt to cross the Channel in 1942, TORCH demonstrated
the benefits of military co-operation, and gave an opportunity to 'blood' US
troops for the first time. Where next to deploy those blooded troops was to be the crux of
the Casablanca deliberations, at a time when the strategic situation could have gone
either way.
By this time also, American naval activity in the Atlantic
had increased significantly in terms both of escort and merchant shipping - the use
of American shipyards was making up for losses, while a proper convoy system was in place
for trans-Atlantic shipping. The ability to transport goods and troops across the Atlantic
was crucial to the continuation of the war, to the build-up of troops in the UK for an
eventual invasion of the continent (BOLERO), and to the very survival of the UK. The
threat posed to all of this by the U-boats was therefore to be high on the list of
priorities when the Allies met at Casablanca.
Meanwhile the USAAF was creating its 8th Air Force
in the UK, about which there was to be a dispute at Casablanca. In the Pacific, the war
that was developing was largely an American one - the sinking of the British ships
Prince
of Wales and Repulse in December 1941 and the fall of Singapore in February
1942, deprived the British of any significant military presence, except in India, and
virtually no naval presence. The Americans were in the driving seat for directing that
war, and by 1943 their attention turned to how they might bring British troops in India
back into offensive action in order to reassure the beleaguered Chinese Nationalist leader
Chiang Kai-Shek.
The importance of the war leaders to the developing process
of co-operation should not be underestimated. They used their constant communication as a
means to discuss policy and sound out their ideas at the highest possible level, sometimes
bypassing unhelpful elements such as Joseph Kennedy, the defeatist American Ambassador in
London. The ambassadors when war broke out, Lothian for HMG and Kennedy for the US, were
both replaced in 1941 by more obedient and diplomatic men, Halifax and
Winant, denoting
the growing importance of direct communication between the two leaders. Certainly, their
communication was relatively free of diplomatic niceties, and Churchill gave free rein to
his gift for rhetoric. On some matters, their accord could be striking, while on other
occasions, each man was capable of ignoring the other's suggestions; for example,
Churchill was loathe to discuss the British Empire and the possibility that it might have
to be surrendered as the price for American involvement.
Churchill first corresponded with Roosevelt when he entered
the war government as First Lord of the Admiralty. He genuinely respected his American
counterpart, and their correspondence during this period provides a unique insight into
their attitudes towards one another and their developing relationship. Both leaders (and
their aides) pored over the content of their messages to ensure that they gave exactly the
right impression to the other: of Britain's steadfastness, of America's concern,
of Britain's determination and America's restriction. Both men were capable of
being frank, and Churchill could be tenacious. His persistence was equalled, though, by
Roosevelt's ability to read and reply selectively. Another notable feature of the
correspondence is the imbalance: Churchill's communications outnumber
Roosevelt's by approximately three to one, indicating clearly where the power lay.
Roosevelt and Churchill met once before the entry of America
into the war, at Placentia Bay (their first meeting since 1918), and a number of times
between the outbreak of war and Casablanca: at the first Washington conference (ARCADIA),
December 1941, the two leaders confirmed the 'Europe First' strategy; at the
second Washington conference the problems of the second front were discussed, and the
TORCH landings touted as an alternative. In addition, there were numerous other staff
meetings and talks, resulting in the sharing of technology, and agreements to liase on the
construction of atomic weapons (over which there was controversy at Casablanca);
importantly, unity of command in the Allied military was established. The progress made by
Britain and America between 1941 and the Casablanca meeting should not be underestimated.
From uneasy allies, they progressed to a genuinely united front, with unusually close
military, economic and technological co-operation.
Anglo-US relations before American entry into World War II
were by no means as easy or straightforward as one might imagine, given the two
powers' eventual co-operation and joint victory. At the start of war, America was a
nation with a strong non-interventionist streak, and the UK was a suspicious imperial
power that distrusted American intentions. Both sides were heavily influenced by their
respective experiences of the Great War: America thought the British had secret war aims
and imperialist ambitions; Britain thought America would only enter the war if her
territorial or economic interests were blatantly threatened, rather than out of any sense
of obligation to the Old World. Once the issue of America's entry into the war was
settled, she and Britain became impressively close partners, a fact that is often obscured
by the myriad minor differences that manifested themselves between American entry and
eventual victory. While military co-operation was at first grudging, by the time of
Casablanca the first major Anglo-American operation had been carried out (TORCH), joint
structures of command had been established both at theatre and higher levels. For the
first time, and despite the persistently dangerous situation in the Atlantic, the war
looked winnable, and the British and Americans believed they could make significant
strides towards winning it. (4)
Notes
1.
Churchill (1949), p.xiii. Back
2. Bryant (1986), p.282. Back
3. Radio address of the President,
29.12.40. Back
4. Further reading: for the full
FDR-Churchill correspondence, see Kimball (1984); on the development of the Anglo-US
alliance, see Reynolds (1981); on Lend-Lease, see Kimball (1969); for an account of the
major strategic events described, see Keegan (1989)(1). Back
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