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Chapter 2
The Casablanca
Conference was originally intended to be a three-power conference, between the USSR, the
UK and the USA: "Immediately after the African
landings, Roosevelt and Churchill began to talk about sitting down with Stalin. … But
Stalin … was suspicious. Declining the President's invitation in courteous
language, the Soviet generalissimo nevertheless added a tart reminder: "Allow me to
express my confidence that the promises about the opening of the second front in Europe
given … in regard to 1942, and in any case with regard to the spring of 1943, will be
fulfilled." (1)
What Stalin did not mention was that his fear of flying meant
he could not face attending unless the conference was on Soviet soil. His absence made
things both easier and more difficult: easier, because there was a genuine co-operative
alliance between the British and the Americans, which could function in a more trusting
atmosphere; more difficult because the decisions reached would have to take account of the
Soviet perspective, even though there was nobody at the conference to express that
perspective.
After the TORCH landings in November 1942, it was clear that
there were a number of important issues that needed to be considered for 1943:
-
The future of operations in Tunisia, which were not completed
as quickly as had been hoped;
-
The future of Grand Strategy – TORCH had served to
convince Stalin that the Allies were serious in pursuing the war, but it had not been a
true Second Front. Now the CCS had to decide whether to cross the Channel in force, pursue
the Mediterranean option or concentrate more resources on the Pacific. They also had to
consider the best use to make of a growing strategic bomber force available in the UK;
-
The desperate supply situation of the UK – the U-boat
wolf packs were working extremely well at the end of 1942, their success being compounded
by the Allies' loss of the ability to read naval Enigma traffic during the latter
half of the year. The situation had serious implications for Stalin, who was receiving aid
from British convoys, and for the logistics of strategy in 1943;
-
The political situation in North Africa following
Eisenhower's militarily expedient but diplomatically disastrous deal with Admiral
Jean Darlan, the Vichy vice-premier who had chanced to be in North Africa at the time of
TORCH. Even though it had spared much bloodshed, Churchill and Roosevelt were under strong
political pressure, and both were seeking ways of turning control of the French colonies
to their advantage under a more acceptable leadership.
There was therefore, considerable need to assess the future
of the war in 1943, and the proposed meeting was discussed by the two leaders from the
start of December onwards. The suggestion to meet in North Africa was Roosevelt's,
who famously said that he preferred "a comfortable oasis to the raft at Tilsit"
(by which he indicated a desire to avoid discussion of post-war issues, hence a complete
exclusion of the State Department).(2) The preparations were
made by Eisenhower's staff in North Africa and by British representatives from the
COS, including Colonel Ian Jacob. Deciding against Churchill's repeatedly stated
preference for Marrakech, the resort of Anfa, a suburb of Casablanca, was secured. It
contained a number of luxurious villas, as well as a hotel large enough to accommodate all
of the participants; its proximity to the coast made it easy to maintain communications
with London, via the H.M.S. Bulolo.
The prospect of the trip excited both men enormously –
Roosevelt always relished the idea of hoodwinking the press and public as to his
whereabouts, while both men had great fun creating code-names for themselves: Roosevelt
suggested Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, an interesting choice which Churchill, with
characteristic attention to detail, rejected, perhaps lest the conference be dubbed
'quixotic'.(3) He suggested Admiral Q. and Mr. P.,
noting with a typical touch that 'We must mind our P's and Q's.' (4) It is also worth noting FDR rarely travelled, because of his
illness – he was to leave the United States only a handful of times in his lifetime.
The journey to Casablanca, and the stop-over in the British colony of Gambia, were
probably influential for him. They provided a window on the world of colonialism, about
which he and Churchill were to find themselves arguing.
Examination of the correspondence between the two men from
December 1st 1942 to their arrival at Casablanca gives a quick indication of
the business which awaited at Casablanca.(5) The largest
number of exchanges during this period was on various aspects of the political situation
in North Africa and the mess in which Eisenhower had mired his command (22 in a total of
83), a clear indication that the issues were both complex and contentious. A handful of
messages made reference to the shipping situation in the Atlantic and other parts of the
world, while in an exchange of lengthy telegrams, the demands of Chiang Kai-Shek for
greater assistance were debated. The most significant matter referred to was the
Allies' relationship with Stalin and his desire for a Second Front. Most discussion
took place in the knowledge that only a conference could resolve this, the most critical
issue, and from the middle of December the two leaders turned their attention to
attempting to gain Stalin's participation. It is notable that major issues of Grand
Strategy do not make any appearance whatsoever in their pre-conference messages – the
only telegram which makes any attempt to survey the state of the war was one of
Churchill's, which provided an overview of the logistics of production in 1943, and
is mostly concerned with manpower, shipping and munitions, not operations.(6)
As has already been mentioned, FDR was anxious to avoid
bringing State Department officials, claiming the conference would have nothing to do with
foreign policy. For this reason, Churchill was forced to exclude Eden, his Foreign
Secretary, in order to advance Roosevelt's case. Thus when the conference began the
participants were, with a few exceptions, either military men or political advisors to the
war leaders. The full list of participants is shown in the following table, civilians in
the right hand column, and military men on the left:
| The American Contingent: |
|
|
| Joint Chiefs of Staff: |
|
Harry Hopkins |
| General George C. Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff |
|
Averell Harriman |
| Admiral Ernest J. King, C-in-C US Fleet |
|
Robert Murphy |
| General H.H. Arnold, Commander USAAF |
|
|
|
|
|
| General Brehon B. Somervell, Commander, US Army Service
Forces |
|
|
|
|
|
| The British Contingent: |
|
|
| Chiefs of Staff: |
|
Lord Leathers, British Minister of War
Transport |
| Field Marshall Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial
General Staff |
|
Harold Macmillan, Minister Resident |
| Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord |
|
|
| Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal |
|
|
| Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Head of Combined
Operations |
|
|
|
|
|
| Field Marshall Sir John Dill, Head of the Joint Service
Mission, representative of the COS in Washington |
|
|
| General Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of
Defence (Churchill) |
|
(7) |
A notable absentee was Admiral William D. Leahy, FDR's
chief of staff and the Chairman of the JCS. He fell ill en route and did not attend, a
loss in terms of influence and knowledge of FDR that probably handicapped the Americans
from the start.
With the arrival of these men and their leaders, the stage
was set for the conference. Most were exceptional military minds, but not all tuned in to
the same wavelength – confrontation was likely, although the presence of Dill, at the
instigation of the Americans, gave the hope of accord being reached, for there was no more
skillful a man at overcoming differences between the JCS and COS. It was clear from the
development of the war in 1942 that there were going to be major conflicts over strategy,
while the volume of correspondence over the North Africa situation presaged a similar
confrontation in the political arena.
The personal relationship at this point, though, was in
generally excellent shape: only Churchill had met Stalin at this point, and the
latter's overshadowing of the special relationship was to come later. In a Christmas
message to Churchill, FDR had cabled 'The old teamwork is grand,' and at this
point it certainly was strong and healthy.(8) The two
leaders, both strong proponents of personal diplomacy, conferred most evenings, until what
Roosevelt referred to as 'the Winston hours,' usually around 2 a.m. (9) Both enjoyed themselves at the conference, Churchill eating,
drinking and playing bezique, Roosevelt inspecting American troops and enjoying a rare
vacation from the hothouse atmosphere of Washington politics. Regardless of apparent
fissures among the CCS, and despite disagreements over various issues (as we shall see in
Chapter 3), there could not have been a stronger basis on which to build a political and
strategic consensus on how to conduct the war in 1943. (10)
Notes
1. Murphy (1964), p.205.
Back
2. Kimball (1984), R-224.
Back
3. Kimball (1984), R-252.
Back
4. Kimball (1984), C-253.
Back
5. Kimball (1984): On the
political situation in N.Africa: R-225, R-232, C-227, C-229, R-236, C-236, R-241, C-239,
R-245, R-246, C-242, C-243, C-244, C-246, R-247, C-249, C-249/1, R-250, C-251, R-252,
C-253. On shipping: C-233, C-234, R-239, C-247, R-251, C-257. On China: R-254, C-258. On
Stalin and the Second Front: C-216, R-224, C-219, C-224, R-230, R-231, C-230, R-234/1
(letter), R-238, C-235. Back
6. Kimball (1984), C-247.
Back
7. Sources for the list of
attendees are numerous; these are the principal protagonists as listed in FRUS (visitors
are not included on this list). Back
8. Kimball (1984), R-244.
Back
9. Kimball (1997), p.184.
Back
10. Further reading: the
most useful overview of the conference is Kimball (1997), Ch.6; many participants have
recounted the roles they played, including Hopkins, Harriman, Murphy, Elliott Roosevelt,
Macmillan and Brooke; there is also Churchill himself. The accounts vary in quality and
detail, but generally all agree on the problems and the solutions found to them. For
details of all the above-mentioned memoirs see the Bibliography; on the role of Dill as a
broker, see Danchev (1986). Back
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