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Chapter 3
This
chapter is split into a number of sections, covering all of the main issues that were
dealt with at Casablanca: The Combined Bomber Offensive
The Battle of the Atlantic
The Grand Strategic Vision
Absent Ally - The Spectre of Stalin
Roosevelt's Fourth Policeman,
Churchill's Pet Project - China and Turkey
Unconditional Surrender
The de Gaulle - Giraud Affair
TUBE ALLOYS - The Silent Controversy
The Combined
Bomber Offensive
The Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) was conceived with the
following objective: 'the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German
military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German
people to the point where their capacity for armed defence is fatally weakened.'(1) This involved the bombing of German targets by night by the
RAF, and daylight raiding, without fighter cover, by bombers of the USAAF's 8th
Air Force.
Churchill was initially reluctant to approve the CBO -
precision daylight bombing was considered by many in the RAF to be impracticable and
dangerous, despite the obvious advantages in terms of seeing the target (although much
still depended upon the weather). In a directive prior to the conference he wrote:
The brute fact remains that the American bombers so far
have rarely gone beyond the limits of British fighter escort. … They have not so far
dropped a single bomb on Germany. … We should, of course, continue to give the
Americans every encouragement and help in the experiment which they ardently and
obstinately wish to make. (2)
The Americans, though, were confident in the defensive
armament of their bombers, and wished to go ahead with the project, describing how they
and the RAF between them would bomb Germany 'around the clock' (an aphorism
holding a certain appeal for Churchill).
At this stage of the war, with BOLERO nowhere near later
levels, Churchill exerted much more strategic influence than he was later to have.
However, at a meeting at his villa for lunch on the 20th of January, Churchill
met Major General Ira C. Eaker, the officer commanding all US air forces in the UK. FRUS
states that no official record of such a meeting exists, but speculates that this was
where Churchill was persuaded to drop his opposition to the principle of daylight bombing.
In his diary Eaker mentions that Churchill had met General Carl A. Spaatz, his predecessor
in the UK, on the previous day for the same purpose.(3)
Churchill mentions no such meeting, but gives his own account of the meeting with Eaker in
his history of the war thus:
Considering how much had been staked on this venture by the
United States, and all they felt about it, I decided to back Eaker in his theme, and I
turned round completely and withdrew all my opposition to the daylight bombing by the
Fortresses. (4)
This implies that Churchill was persuaded merely by the
merits of the argument, but given his earlier objections, and given that he viewed his
books with the attitude that 'this is not history, this is my case,' we cannot
completely rely on him to present the situation as it actually happened.(5) In reality, the British were gaining much of what they wanted from the
conference in terms of the strategic agenda (see section on The Grand
Strategic Vision). It would seem entirely plausible, then, that dropping all
objections to the daylight sections of the CBO was a significant quid pro quo to
the Americans. In addition, Churchill must have seen that any efforts by the 8th
Air Force were preferable to its current state of inactivity.
While we have seen Churchill's opinions on the subject,
and his eventual agreement to allow the Americans to proceed, there is little to indicate
that Roosevelt took any close interest in the matter. There is no record of him making any
comment on it one way or the other. The subject was only briefly raised at the JCS meeting
held on the 15th, which was FDR's final consultation with his commanders
before they began consultation with their British counterparts.(6)
The aspect of the subject raised, namely the subordination of US air forces to a British
commander, apparently elicited no comment from the President. Again, at a meeting between
Roosevelt, Churchill and the CCS, Roosevelt, who spoke on a number of topics at the
meeting, including the cross-channel invasion concept and the timetable for that
operation, let the matter pass without comment.(7) The fact
that it was General Marshall providing the progress report suggests that on strategic
matters that did not particularly interest him the President was content to let his
subordinates handle such matters, and trusted Marshall. The fact that Churchill met alone
with the USAAF generals indicates the matter was of peripheral concern to Roosevelt at the
conference - had he been deeply concerned it is quite likely that Hopkins or Harriman
would have attended to present his point of view.
There is little evidence that the important but
uncontroversial issue of CBO affected the relationship between the two war leaders at
SYMBOL. Churchill, always the more willing to 'dirty his hands' on the workings
of strategy and technology, was persuaded to drop his opposition after some consultations
with a leading proponent, and given the rarity with which the topic was broached in the
CCS meetings, we may assume that it was not the most central topic of discussion. Indeed,
we may conclude that it was the least controversial major topic of the entire conference.
The Combined Bomber Offensive was a pragmatic strategy, based on differences in technology
and operational approach; it vexed Churchill, but in its handling one can discern little
hint of the personal relationship between the two war leaders.(8)
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The Battle of the Atlantic
At the time of the Casablanca conference, Allied merchant
shipping losses were dangerously heavy - 860,000 tons in November 1942 alone.(9) Ways of reducing these losses were obviously at the
forefront of Allied thinking, but there was only one major departure from current strategy
proposed at Casablanca - this was the use of heavy bombers based in the UK to strike
at a variety of U-boat related targets, such as the submarine pens on the Bay of Biscay,
and any factory that was believed to be manufacturing U-boat components. General Marshall
expressed it as the idea that 'we must keep hammering on one link in the chain,
whether it be the factories which manufacture component parts, the submarine assembly
yards, submarine bases, or submarines along the sea lanes.'(10)
The policy was well supported throughout the CCS and by the
war leaders - while Allied shipping losses were so desperate, any inroads that could
be made into the German capability to create, put to sea and supply submarines might offer
vital respite to the beleaguered convoys. Given that resolutions were similarly being made
about the combination of UK and US bomber forces with a new strategic direction (the
CBO),
Casablanca was the most logical time to reach such agreements. Technically, this
particular decision belongs under the auspices of the CBO - however, the fact that
this was the only new anti-submarine warfare idea proposed at the conference, and that it
was being considered in the context of the larger Battle of the Atlantic means that it
should be dealt with here.
The Battle of the Atlantic was discussed seven times at
Casablanca. Unlike the CBO, it was the subject of direct consultation between Churchill
and Roosevelt on several occasions, including their face to face meeting of the conference
on the evening of January 14. The relatively large number of discussions might suggest
some degree of controversy or conflict, but that was not in fact the case. Rather, the
number of times it was discussed is indicative of how urgent it was felt to be -
while the conference progressed, the future of the Allied war effort in Europe was being
decided by the U-boat wolfpacks and the Allied escort ships. Neither Roosevelt nor
Churchill realised that the battle had actually been won - never again would the
wolfpacks be so successful - but in order to remedy the U-boat peril, it was ordered
that the production level of escort vessels be maintained if not stepped up in 1943.
Largely though, there was little the conference could achieve - all efforts were
being made by the relevant commands, and one suspects that their shared love for the navy
was what drew Roosevelt and Churchill to the subject. Roosevelt had been Assistant
Secretary of the Navy in Woodrow Wilson's WW1 administration, and was always more
interested in ships than any other branch of the military, while Churchill's love of
the navy is well known.
FDR's communication with Churchill when the latter
returned to the Admiralty on the outbreak of war was ostensibly so Churchill could keep
Roosevelt in touch with naval developments. It was to provide the foundation for a greater
degree of naval co-operation later in the war. Before America's formal entry into the
war, it was in the field of naval activity that FDR was most helpful to the UK, providing
escorts well into the Atlantic and pursuing rules of engagement that led to the loss of
American lives in conflict with the U-boats. It could be said that naval affairs,
especially with regard to the Atlantic situation, were the bedrock of the personal
relationship. This continued to be the case at Casablanca, and the issues of the U-boat
war and the Battle of the Atlantic were as non-controversial as the Combined Bomber
Offensive turned out to be. Both men were confident in their own abilities to assess the
situation, and neither saw much conflict, or scope for conflict - the sustenance of
Britain was central to both of their strategic conceptions of the war, and it was
axiomatic to the Americans that the war would be ended by a massive invasion of the
continent from bases in England. Victory in the Atlantic struggle was a pre-requisite for
the build-up of troops and weapons necessary to carry this through.(11)
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The Grand Strategic Vision
"We came, we listened and we were conquered."
General A C Wedemeyer, US Army (12)
The JCS considered that they 'lost' at Casablanca,
that they were talked into a strategy to which they had no intention of subscribing at the
start of the conference, despite the fact that the British circulated an agenda weeks
before the conference.(13) Murphy talked of the Americans
as a 'reluctant tail to the British kite,' while Marshall was well aware that
the British had outplanned and outmanoeuvred their American counterparts.(14) As we shall see, the British did indeed gain agreement for their
strategic agenda, against the better judgement of the Americans, and with the able
assistance of Churchill. Roosevelt offered no comparable support to the JCS.
It is possible to consider some elements of Grand Strategy
for 1943 discretely; for example the Combined Bomber Offensive and the Battle of the
Atlantic. But when it comes to operations on land, or amphibious operations requiring
landing craft, naval and air support and logistics, it is not so easy to consider each
theatre of operations in isolation, largely because operations in one were likely to be at
the expense of the others. At the beginning of 1943, Anglo-US forces were disposed in two
theatres against the Germans, and in one against the Japanese. A number of divisions, both
British (in which we include Commonwealth and Dominion troops) and American, were held in
the UK, partly for home defence and partly as part of BOLERO, which was envisaged as
eventually leading to the invasion of North-West Europe. American and British troops were
also engaged in ongoing operations in North Africa, where they were following up the
successful TORCH landings with the conquest of Tunisia. The troops in the Pacific were
largely American, although there was a significant British presence in India and South
East Asia, hence the feasibility of undertaking operations in support of the Chinese in
1943. When the CCS met at the start of the Casablanca conference, they were faced with a
number of dilemmas and decisions on the broad outline of Grand Strategy, before they
decided on the actual operations to be undertaken. These were as follows:
-
What splitting of resources and effort to effect between the
European / North African theatre and the Pacific / Far Eastern Theatre;
-
Whether or not to undertake an invasion of north-west Europe
in 1943;
-
What operations to undertake in the Mediterranean in 1943, if
any;
-
Whether or not to open a full-scale Second Front in 1943, and
if so, where.
The details of the strategic arguments, which raged among the
CCS (not necessarily along national lines) and their planners, are too intricate to go
into here. A number of writers have summarised them, and particular attention should be
drawn to Michael Howard's Grand Strategy, where chapters XIII and XIV
deal with future strategy and future operations respectively. The 'broker',
Field Marshall Dill, was vital to the resolution of a number of thorny issues, and the CCS
met numerous times to thrash out a way of taking the fight to the Axis.(15) Our concern, though, is with the war leaders - what did they
think of the issues, and to what extent did this opinion shape the position of their
country at the negotiating table? More importantly, how did their opinions affect the way
they treated each other?
Churchill, as had been apparent since the Great War,
considered himself to be a keen strategic thinker - he is famous during that conflict
for having masterminded the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign while First Lord of the
Admiralty. A preoccupation with peripheral strategies and attacking the 'soft
underbelly' of the Axis marked out his thinking during the WW2 as well, and he and
the COS were very much in tune in wanting to avoid major cross-Channel operations in 1943.
However, Churchill was prepared to countenance some form of SLEDGEHAMMER in 1943, that is
a limited operation against France, with the objective of provoking air and naval battles
with the Germans, as well as of forcing the Wehrmacht to divert more troops from
the Russian front. The minutes record that:
Mr. Churchill then discussed operation SLEDGEHAMMER. He
thought … that plans should be made to undertake it, including the appointment of a
Commander and the fixing of a target date. He had not been in favour of such an operation
in 1942 but felt that it was our duty to engage the enemy on as wide a front as possible. (16)
He did not favour ROUNDUP, that is a major return to the
Continent in force, for 1943. One senses with Churchill's advocacy of SLEDGEHAMMER,
though, that the politician in him was talking, rather than the strategist - he did
not wish to contradict the desire of the Americans to make some impact on the continent.
Churchill was a persistent advocate of caution in planning cross-Channel operations,
remembering clearly the disastrous 1942 Dieppe raid. Given his preoccupation with the
Mediterranean, this policy points to an awareness of the danger of being out of step with
American opinion too badly, especially with the opinion of Marshall, a persistent advocate
of SLEDGEHAMMER and critic of Mediterranean operations. Churchill probably knew that by
supporting the invasion of Sicily he made ROUNDUP impossible and SLEDGEHAMMER unlikely,
without alienating Marshall or the JCS.
Churchill was all in favour of the operation in Burma
proposed by the Americans (ANAKIM), especially as it enhanced the safety of his beloved
India, and as it reassured the Americans that he was serious about the British commitment
to war in the Pacific. Churchill made it plain that 'not only are British interests
involved, her honour is engaged' in the Pacific, demonstrating the political and
diplomatic value he invested in military policy. (17) It
almost goes without saying that Churchill was enthusiastic for operations in the
Mediterranean: he wanted to see the invasion of Sicily as soon as possible (preferably by
May 1943), wanted to retake the Dardanelles from the Germans, and bring Turkey into the
conflict as soon as possible. Always his own man strategically, Churchill was, as we shall
see, fundamentally different in his approach to matters of strategy to FDR.
The British out-planning of the Americans was due in no small
part to a Royal Navy vessel, H.M.S. Bulolo, a floating library and communications
centre, with a large staff (much larger than the Americans had thought to bring with
them).(18) The British monopoly on communication allowed
Churchill to stay closely in touch with events, including with the products of ULTRA
intelligence (during the conference Churchill sent a number of telegrams to the War
Cabinet demanding that he be sent more secret intelligence).(19)
The use of secret intelligence, while the information was shared between the British and
the Americans, undoubtedly gave the edge to the British, who knew from Enigma decrypts far
more about the Russian front than Stalin was telling them, including the progress of the
battle for Stalingrad. Furthermore, Churchill's 'hands on' style gave him
the edge in his personal relationship with Roosevelt, who did not process information in
the same way as Churchill.
Roosevelt was not disposed to spend his time pondering
matters of strategy. As we have seen, he was quite prepared to delegate the definition of
American strategy to the JCS, subject to his approval. The relationship between the two
leaders on matters of strategy was at this point excellent. There were apparently no major
disagreements between them at the conference over major issues of strategy: Roosevelt
supported ANAKIM, as it assisted his pet cause, the Chinese Nationalist Government; his
keen desire to woo Stalin meant that he was also enthusiastic for a Second Front, thus his
support both for the concept of some sort of SLEDGEHAMMER in 1943, and for the invasion of
Sicily. That all of his causes were being furthered made him more amenable to assisting
Churchill, namely in the British aim of bringing Turkey into the war, which had been
important in the Great War, and a Mediterranean strategy. Churchill had taken advantage of
Roosevelt's hands-off strategic style, and his need for action for domestic political
consumption, by getting him to agree to TORCH at a time when JCS opinion was in favour of
the invasion of France, not North African adventures. He appears to have achieved a
similar result this time, by allowing the COS to dominate, and ultimately win, the
arguments of the CCS, and then demonstrating in his support of the CCS proposals, ideals
of which Roosevelt could not help but approve, i.e. a swift Second Front, support of both
Russia and China.
The personal relationship was never at its most important
when determining matters of strategy. Most of the meetings for which records exist, where
both leaders were present without the CCS show a general avoidance of strategic discussion
- the topic of conversation was more often the de Gaulle - Giraud controversy,
or the need to reassure Stalin, than it was purely strategic matters.(20) After all, determining strategy was the raison d'être of the
CCS, and however 'hands on' Churchill's approach, Roosevelt was not a war
leader in the same sense as Churchill - he had been first elected in peacetime,
although as President he was the Commander-in-Chief of the American military, conferring
vast if rather vague powers. Churchill's knowledge of Roosevelt, of his approach, his
geo-political and diplomatic agenda, and of his trust in his COS, were what enabled him to
pull off a British 'victory' at Casablanca, and the minutes of the various CCS
sessions at which the war leaders were present show us little except agreement. The most
important meeting as far as we are concerned was held on the 18th January: all
of the issues discussed here were agreed upon, and others were touched upon. Roosevelt and
Churchill both appear from the minutes to be thoroughly satisfied with progress, united in
their approach, and sometimes more closely in tune with each other than with the CCS.
On the night of the 24th, at Marrakech after the
end of the conference proper, Churchill and Roosevelt approved a joint letter to the COS
and JCS, as a response to their final proposals for conduct of the war in 1943. Martin
Gilbert describes the scene:
While 'cordially approving' these proposals,
Churchill and Roosevelt, in a joint reply, stressed four points: the desirability of
finding means of running the convoys to North Russia even through the period of the Sicily
landings, the urgency of sending air reinforcements to China and of finding personnel to
making them fully operative, the importance of achieving a June landing in Sicily and the
'grave detriment to our interest which will be incurred by an apparent suspension of
activities during summer months', and fourthly, the need to build up the United
States striking force in Britain 'more quickly', so as to be able to
'profit by favourable August weather' for some form of cross-Channel attack. (21)
This should serve as a reminder that both men were first and
foremost politicians, enjoying an excellent relationship and a remarkable degree of
harmony in the context of an already co-operative and stable alliance. There is little
evidence of discord in their view of the strategy for pursuing the war in 1943,
demonstrating that whatever their differences, their similarities were often greater.(22)
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Absent Ally - The Spectre of
Stalin
The PM had all along made clear that before any triangular
meeting, it would be necessary for the President and himself to get together in order to
agree on … operations in 1943, and frame an answer to Stalin's questions. The
President, on the other hand, seemed to think that Stalin would dislike the idea of the
British and the Americans putting their heads together before bringing him into the
discussion.
Colonel Ian Jacob, diary (23)
The need to reassure the USSR was high on the list of
political priorities for the war leaders when they met at Casablanca. Stalin, as the sole
Soviet decision-maker, had been invited to the conference, as Roosevelt was anxious that
there should be a proper three-power discussion. However, the situation on the Russian
front (which Churchill received ULTRA decrypts about throughout the conference, including
a detailed report on Stalingrad on the 19th) meant that Stalin was unwilling to
leave his country, and the conference was thus confined to the two 'Western'
Allies. Churchill found himself in a situation where he would have better access to the
President, would not be eclipsed by Stalin, and could pursue his country's strategic
agenda to best advantage.
The need to reassure Stalin was paramount, and was the main
reason FDR wished to see him face to face, especially in light of Churchill's visit
to Moscow in August 1942. Travelling to the USSR was not really an option for FDR, for we
should not forget that two things made travel difficult for Roosevelt: one was his
physical disability, the result of infection by polio; the other was the constitutional
difficulties which he would cite as making it impossible for him to leave the US for a
prolonged period (a restriction he overcame when it suited him). A vast amount of German
manpower and resources were being poured into the Russian front, and Stalin was desperate
for a 'Second Front', something which would draw off a significant number of
German divisions. With the victory of the British at Casablanca in setting a strategic
agenda that was of their own conception, there would be no Second Front in Europe, merely
an invasion of Sicily (HUSKY), with the promise of a cross-channel invasion in 1944. This
was not going to be to Stalin's liking: the promise of the Combined Bomber Offensive
and the Sicily operation would not by themselves bring about a German collapse, even if
the Sicily operation did lead to the invasion of Italy later in 1943. There were other
reasons to reassure Stalin: the deal with Darlan before his death at the end of 1942
demonstrated to many that the Allies would deal with traitors and collaborators, and it
was in order to allay this concern that the policy of Unconditional Surrender was
conceived.
Fears that Stalin might come to a negotiated peace with
Hitler were not uncommon - after all, he had signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 with
no apparent qualms. Reassuring Stalin was not just desirable, it was crucial, because
without the Russian war effort Germany might countenance all sorts of other escapades, or,
more dangerously, reinforce France to the point where invasion was impossible. The
activities of the Allies to date suggested no serious commitment to relieving Stalin
- TORCH had been useful for 'blooding' American troops, but had not
significantly changed the focus of Nazi strategic priorities (Hitler did reinforce
Tunisia, but there was little he could have done to prevent its eventual fall to the
Allies). The invasion of Sicily was not likely to help much, although it did provide a
number of options for future strategy. The supply of American Lend-Lease goods was
seriously threatened by the vulnerability of the Arctic convoys to German air and sea
attack, and Stalin's stubborn refusal to allow Allied aircraft to fly out of Murmansk
to protect the convoys hardly helped matters. The Combined Bomber Offensive was designed
to assist Russia by damaging Germany's production capacity and morale on her home
front, but the Sicily invasion was one of two operations planned for Western Europe in
1943, apart from the completion of victory in North Africa, and it was initially thought
that mounting that operation would entail the cancellation of Arctic convoys for several
months owing to shortages of shipping. The closing stages of the conference produced the
resolution by the war leaders that these convoys should be continued regardless, such was
their psychological and material importance to the Soviets. 'No investment could pay
a better military dividend,' said Churchill, who insisted that the convoys must be
got through.(24) Along with his change of heart on the
CBO,
this clearly illustrates the value of having the war leaders present at a strategic
conference - their politico-military outlook is vital to offset the purely military
considerations of the military staff. The existence of the personal relationship seems
have made it easier for Churchill to prevail in situations where he perceived political
dimensions to military issues that Roosevelt did not.
Roosevelt and Churchill were both agreed on the importance of
the Soviet Union to the conduct of the Second World War: as soon as Russia had been
attacked, Churchill had swallowed his anti-Communist principles to extend rhetorical
encouragement with limited military support, while Roosevelt saw Stalin as a man with whom
he could do business. Part of the thinking behind Allied policy towards the Soviets was
the desire to ensure their participation in the war in the Pacific, a conflict which it
was anticipated at this point would go on at least two years after the end of the war in
Europe. It was predictable that Stalin would affect the personal relationship, and he
certainly did: by the end of the war, Churchill was the junior partner in the three-power
relationship. Roosevelt's desire to meet with Stalin at the beginning of 1943, and
Churchill's realisation that a condominium of the two great powers would lead to the
eclipse of British influence, were both apparent in their handling of the situation in the
run up to, and during, the Casablanca conference. The personal relationship, however
strong it may generally have been at the time of Casablanca, was still, as the
principals' attitudes to Stalin demonstrated, inherently tied to diplomatic and
geo-political realities, especially the rise of the Soviet Union and the decline of the
British Empire.(25)
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Roosevelt's Fourth Policeman,
Churchill's Pet Project - China and Turkey
The Americans harboured a far more positive attitude to the
Chinese than the British, who saw them as militarily and politically weak, and
strategically of little value; Churchill perceived them as a waste of time and resources.
Roosevelt, on the other hand, was looking to a postwar system of global security in which
'Four Policeman' kept the international peace. These were to be America, the
USSR, Britain and China, which was weak, but considered a 'policeman in
waiting.' This, along with the US inability to mount major operations in the Pacific
in 1943, and the need to maintain pressure on Japan, account for Roosevelt's
determined stance.
It was a need to reassure the Chinese Nationalist Government,
and its head, Chiang Kai-Shek, that created the plan for the British offensive into Burma
from India (ANAKIM). This would reopen the Burma Road, and provide a land-based route for
the supply of the Chinese. When the JCS offered to provide all of the landing craft and
crews, and the naval support for the operation, the British were unlikely to refuse.
Churchill, whatever his misgivings about the Chinese, generally humoured Roosevelt -
the Far East and Pacific were after all primarily American theatres of operation, where
Britain depended upon the US to defend her Antipodean dominions. He did use the personal
relationship to resist attempts to have the Chinese present at a wartime conference (these
eventually failed, with the Cairo conference). However, the broadest strategic issues
involving the Chinese (whether they were worth being allied to, how far to go in assisting
them) did not arise at SYMBOL, while the commitment to ANAKIM was as much to do with
keeping up pressure on the Japanese as it was to do with easing the supply situation of
Nationalist China. The Chinese issue did not really vex the personal relationship -
Churchill knew Roosevelt well enough to know that silence was the most prudent option with
regard to Sino-American policy, and he generally held his peace. The personal relationship
thus provided the knowledge to ease diplomatic relations and strategic discussions, an
undoubtedly important function.
In the same way as Franco's Spain was pursued by
Germany, Turkey was 'always wooed but never won' by the Allies, who sought bases
in the Balkans and unrestricted access to Russia via the Black Sea. Britain had a stronger
Mediterranean perspective on strategy than the US, which tended to subscribe to the view
of Marshall that the Mediterranean theatre would prove to be a 'suction pump.'
Britain donated significant amounts of arms to Turkey. In addition, Churchill undoubtedly
harboured the desire, conscious or not, to prove the validity of the strategic concept
underlying the Gallipoli campaign of the Great War.
The Casablanca conference produced the resolution that
getting Turkey in to the war should be solely in the hands of the British:
The Prime Minister asked that the British be allowed to
play the Turkish hand, just as the United States is now handling the situation with
reference to China. The British would keep the United States informed at all times.(26)
Given that the Americans wished to avoid Mediterranean
entanglements, their relinquishing of involvement looks like a sign of goodwill, for by
bowing out they were surrendering the chance to interfere in a policy they may have
harboured reservations about. It is likely, given the complete absence of State Department
officials among the American delegation, that this was the personal initiative of
Roosevelt, who was the only American present with the authority to make that decision. It
suggests the existence of a strong personal dimension between the war leaders in
determining foreign policy, despite (or perhaps because of) the absence of Cordell Hull,
the American Secretary of State, and Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary. This was
to be an enduring facet of the personal relationship (it had already manifested itself
with regard to Eire, Vichy France, Spain and other nations in the two men's
correspondence), and one which was later to be extended to the three way relationship
between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin.(27)
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Unconditional Surrender
The doctrine of unconditional surrender was not new -
when pronouncing it, Roosevelt referred to examples from the American Civil War to
illustrate its validity. While it may not have been new to history, it was relatively new
to WW2. The President announced the policy at the press conference on the 24th
of January, the final day of conference business, saying:
I think that we have all had it in our hearts and heads
before, but I don't think that it has ever been put down on paper by the Prime
Minister and myself, and that is the determination that peace can come to the world only
by the total elimination of German and Japanese war power, [which means] the unconditional
surrender by Germany, Italy and Japan.(28)
This was the only new policy of any note to emerge from the
conference, and is therefore the policy for which the conference is most remembered. The
policy was based on the legacy of the First World War armistice, which had ended the
conflict without the occupation of Germany or Austria, and led to the myth that Germany
was 'stabbed in the back' by socialists, which Hitler exploited during his rise
to power. Therefore, a desire to learn from the lessons of the past was a major motivator.
In addition, it was felt that such a strong policy might crush home morale in the Axis
nations, and the will of the Axis political and military elites that were pursuing the
war.
According to FRUS, Roosevelt floated the policy at a luncheon
meeting at his villa on the 23rd, receiving the strong approval of Harry
Hopkins and the assent of Churchill. This information is based on the recollections of
FDR's son, Elliott, who was present for many of the Casablanca meetings, although the
editorial note states that he may well have been confused about the date of the
conversation.(29) Certainly, the meeting was not the first
time the concept had been floated: before leaving for the conference, Roosevelt told the
JCS that he was going to ask Churchill for such a policy in order to reassure Stalin.
Churchill told the House of Commons in 1949 that the concept had certainly been discussed
informally a number of times in conversations between him and the President, and the
minute of a meeting of the two war leaders with the CCS reads:
The Prime Minister suggested ... we release a statement
to the effect that the United Nations are resolved to pursue the war to the bitter end,
neither partly relaxing in its efforts until the unconditional surrender of Germany and
Japan had been achieved.(30)
Based on the evidence presented in FRUS, the two men were in
accord over the policy. However, there is evidence to suggest that the policy actually put
a significant strain on the personal relationship, and that it illustrated the limitations
of the personal alliance between the two men, as well as some of the strengths. Averell
Harriman met with Churchill on the evening of the press conference, the 24th,
and recalls:
[Churchill] was in high dudgeon. He was offended that
Roosevelt should have made such a momentous announcement without prior consultation and I
am sure he did not like the manner of it. I had seen him unhappy with Roosevelt more than
once, but this time he was more deeply offended than before. I also had the impression he
feared it might make the Germans fight all the harder.(31)
It is not clear what angered Churchill. Possibly it was the
inclusion of Italy in the formula. Part of the thinking behind the planned invasion of
Sicily (HUSKY) was that it might knock Italy out of the war, and Churchill was prepared to
countenance a settlement in order to speed up the defeat of Germany, especially if it
avoided the need for a full scale invasion of the continent. Possibly it was that
Churchill envisaged the policy as for diplomatic consumption, rather than the public
gesture that Roosevelt so typically made it into. Britain lacked the resources to pursue
the policy without massive American aid, and enforcing Unconditional Surrender went
against the grain of traditional British policy towards the continent, which was generally
concerned with the balance of power. If there was only a handful of conversations on the
topic beforehand, it is not surprising that Churchill was caught off guard by the decision
to reveal it to the world, hence his concern that it might make the enemy fight all the
harder in the knowledge that either victory or defeat must be total. The transcript of the
press conference suggests that it may well have been an almost spontaneous and last minute
inclusion, in which case Churchill had every right to be aggrieved. The policy was not
even mentioned in the approved communiqué that accompanied the press conference.(32) If this was the case, it illustrates the President's
capacity for unilateral action, and his ever-increasing tendency to give consideration to
Stalin before Churchill.
The personal relationship at its most intimate level
apparently failed to deal with the problems raised by the Unconditional Surrender policy
(although there is much confusion surrounding the events, caused by the number of
conflicting accounts). If Harriman's recollections are accurate, it failed badly
- after nine days of contact, there should have been no excuse for serious dissent
over policy, or policy surprises, at a press conference that was intended to be a summary
of what had gone before. The fact that Churchill told Harriman all about his apparent
anger, though, does illustrate the value of the trust that each leader placed in the
other's confidantes. Churchill's telling Harriman about his misgiving enabled
Harriman to report them to FDR, who clarified his thinking, making it apparent that he
intended a rehabilitative aspect to the policy that he had not explained.
The handling of Unconditional Surrender demonstrated that FDR
was still capable of unilateral action, and the kind of 'gesture politics' which
were a cardinal feature of his style. He had also demonstrated this in his numerous
heavy-handed attempts to provoke Churchill over the future of French North Africa, and in
his egocentric handling of the de Gaulle - Giraud controversy. Despite failing to
deal with this issue, the fact that the personal relationship could withstand such
disagreements, at least in public, is nevertheless a testament to its durability and
utility.(33)
Back to top
The de Gaulle-Giraud
Affair
It was decided at the beginning that a wedding should be
arranged if possible. The President once said this must be a wedding even if it was a
shotgun wedding, and Murphy and I were responsible for making the necessary arrangements
between the bride and the bridegroom [Giraud]. The bride (General de G.) was very shy and
could not be got to the camp at all until two days before the end. I never thought really
that we would get them both to the church and, as I warned both the emperors [Roosevelt
and Churchill], the dowry required to make anything of it would be quite large.
Harold Macmillan, War Diaries, pp.9-10
Harold Macmillan was appointed Minister Resident at Allied
Headquarters in Northwest Africa on 30th December 1942. He flew out to take up
his post a few days later. His first major task was to attend the Casablanca conference in
his new capacity. The task which confronted him, and Robert Murphy, the President's
personal representative in North Africa, was a challenging one: unite the French forces of
newly liberated North Africa, under the command of General Giraud, with the Free French
organisation under the mercurial leadership of Charles de Gaulle.(34) The objective was to create a strong organisation, politically and
militarily unified and armed by the Allies, to provide the greatest possible assistance to
the war effort. Further, the alliance with Darlan had been a political disaster for
Roosevelt, and to a degree for Churchill, which made it necessary to be seen to solve the
problem. This was a considerable challenge, although the assassination of Darlan in
December 1942, after his change of sides, made the task considerably easier than it might
have been - de Gaulle would most probably never have consented to be in the same room
as Darlan, much less shake hands with him for the cameras, as he was eventually to do with
Giraud.
Giraud was unquestionably not a Vichy loyalist - he was
smuggled out of France in 1942 with the aid of the British, having had nothing to do with
collaborationist regime of Marshall Petain. He was considered by many British and American
diplomats and officers to be ideally suited to leading the French forces of newly
liberated North Africa, and he came across well to those who met him, including Macmillan.
Yet consolidation of the military power of the French required the amalgamation of the
newly freed territories with the Free French. De Gaulle was the leader of the Free French,
and it would be difficult to imagine a more headstrong and proud chief. HMG provided funds
for the Free French movement, and Churchill at the same time loathed and admired de
Gaulle, and the two had an extremely stormy relationship - Churchill, for example,
did not dare tell de Gaulle of TORCH until the very eve of the landings. Brokering a
compromise between these two men was never likely to be an easy task. It is hardly
surprising that the subject was discussed more times at the Casablanca conference than any
other. Quite possibly, the fact that military matters were in the hands of the CCS meant
that Churchill and Roosevelt, and their advisors, felt able to concentrate on such a
thoroughly political matter, namely the resolution of this messy conflict. In addition,
the President needed to take the opportunity to resolve a public relations disaster while
he had all the participants close at hand.
It is not necessary to go into detail as to the nature of the
political settlement, or to examine too closely the comings and goings of Macmillan and
Murphy - suffice to say it was a complex problem, and both men had much to do with
its solution. We are interested in what the issue and its solution can tell us about the
relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill. Roosevelt was in fine spirits when he
arrived at Casablanca, so fine that he did not seem to be interested in difficulties; he
was sublimely confident of his ability to find a solution which would work. As Murphy
recalls: 'the tone of the conference was set by President Roosevelt. His mood was
that of a schoolboy on vacation, which accounted for his almost frivolous approach to the
problems with which he dealt.'(35) This accounts for
the lighthearted nature of the 'shot-gun wedding' analogy, which Roosevelt used
throughout the conference.
The first important point to register is that Roosevelt
harboured an intense dislike for de Gaulle which, unlike Churchill, was not offset by any
respect or admiration for his determination to see his country free; indeed, he harboured
a distinct dislike for the French nation per se, seeing its empire as the worst
manifestation of European colonialism. He was nonetheless quite taken with Giraud (quite
possibly by his disinterest in politics and his malleability), and was more than happy to
leave the obstinate de Gaulle in the political wilderness, especially as he was proving
unwilling to attend the conference. Churchill leaned towards de Gaulle as a solution
- he was a known quantity, could be controlled by means of restricting British
subsidies, and was considered a great if difficult man. Of Giraud, Churchill wrote to FDR
not long before the conference: "Giraud is in my opinion quite unsuited to the
discharge of civil responsibilities."(36) With such
different opinions, no 'special relationship' could have prevented a falling
out, especially given Roosevelt's lack of seriousness in approaching the whole issue.
On one instance, Elliott Roosevelt (not a particularly reliable witness) recalls:
'Churchill advanced the proposal that the French provisional regime might best be
left exclusively to de Gaulle, but the President dismissed the subject "almost
peremptorily."'(37) Churchill, of course, makes
no mention of such a suggestion in his history of the war, but then his account of
meetings and conferences is firmly selective. He also fiercely repudiates suggestions by
Elliott Roosevelt that he was actively seeking to postpone the arrival of de Gaulle at the
conference. The telegrams sent by Churchill to the War Cabinet during the conference
certainly bear him out on this point: one, sent on the 18th January, contains
the text of a message to be delivered to de Gaulle:
The position of His Majesty's Government towards your
Movement while you remain at its head will also require to be reviewed. If with your eyes
open you reject this unique opportunity we shall endeavour to get on as well we can
without you.(38)
The number of occasions on which Roosevelt met Giraud without
Churchill's presence suggests an equally strong preference. The personal relationship
between Roosevelt and Churchill, though, did not help to ease a potential disagreement:
the leaders advocated different solutions, and it would appear that Roosevelt got his way
not by personal diplomacy or consultation, but by simply ignoring Churchill, and pushing
him into arranging the 'shot-gun wedding.' His desire to shape the post-war
future of North Africa, in marked distinction to Churchill's preference of the
colonial status quo, led him to accord Churchill's opinions a lack of respect which
was unusual in their relationship. It might at this point be helpful to explore one of the
greatest underlying tensions of the personal relationship: views on colonialism. Churchill
is famous for having said only a few weeks before that he had 'not become the
King's First Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire,'(39) while Roosevelt was firmly interested in
self-determinism, a concept propagated in the jointly issued Atlantic Charter of August
1941. Elliott Roosevelt reports that on that occasion his father said to Churchill:
I can't believe that we can fight a war against
fascist slavery [at this point, with no immediate prospect of US entry into the war, the
'we' is telling], and at the same time not work to free people all over the
world from a backward colonial policy."(40)
To this end, Roosevelt took advantage of his visit to
Casablanca to meet the Sultan of Morocco, with whom he talked pointedly of Morocco's
post-war aspirations and America's role in them, testified to both by Robert Murphy
and Elliott Roosevelt. Churchill sulked throughout the dinner (although possibly this was
because no alcohol was permitted!).(41) Roosevelt
undoubtedly possessed a cruel streak, and he seemed to enjoy baiting Churchill, who knew
that Britain would be hard-pressed to resist American policies in the post-war world. It
was this anti-colonialism which underlay Roosevelt's approach to the French problem.
Ultimately, Roosevelt wanted someone he could work with (or better still, someone who
would work for him) - that someone he considered to be Giraud, despite his
over-reaching ambition. Roosevelt did not feel that he could work with de Gaulle
(sometimes Churchill felt the same), and thus distrusted Churchill's advocacy of him.
It was important to both Churchill and Roosevelt that the
controversy was resolved, and resolved their way. The solution, in the end, bound the two
French leaders to have 'talks about talks', and the photograph of them shaking
hands in front of a beaming Roosevelt was largely a public relations exercise. They failed
to agree about anything, except that neither should be excluded, nor wished to be
excluded, from the solution. This was in the long-term a victory for de Gaulle, who
marginalised Giraud by the end of 1943. This solution in turn drew the Prime Minister and
the President away from conflict over the issue. Their personal relationship had done
little to alleviate their differences on the matter, and the suggestions are that
Roosevelt allowed his dislike of Churchill's position to become obvious. There was
little actual discussion between them on the matter (discussion as opposed to instruction
by Roosevelt), and the account of Elliott Roosevelt does suggest tension caused by
Roosevelt's attitude to Churchill's views. This situation was exacerbated by
Churchill's apparent inability to exercise control over de Gaulle, leading to
Roosevelt's acid comment that 'I should suggest to him that salaries are paid
for devoted and obedient service, and if he doesn't come, his salary will be cut
off.'(42) De Gaulle came shortly after the suggestion
was made.
Roosevelt and Churchill's special relationship was easy
enough to maintain on issues where they had a common goal - the defeat of Germany,
victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. Where their aims differed widely, it did little
good: Roosevelt supported Giraud, Churchill de Gaulle. That a settlement was reached was
more down to Macmillan, Murphy and Hopkins than the two leaders, who did not discuss the
issue properly, or come to a satisfactory and workable conclusion. Once again, the
limitations of the personal relationship become all too apparent.(43)
Back to top
Tube Alloys - A Silent Controversy
There is a final element to SYMBOL which is hardly apparent
from any records - a running argument between the USA and UK about TUBE ALLOYS, which
had recently been taken over by the US as the Manhattan Project to construct the first
atomic bomb. On 1st November 1942, Churchill received a letter from Dr. Sir
John Anderson, an important member of the British research team, informing him that the US
would not share information on the project with the UK unless that information could be
taken advantage of by the recipient during the course of the current war:
I have today been informed that the United States
Authorities have received an order which restricts interchange of information [on this
subject] by the application of the principle that they are to have complete interchange on
design and construction of new weapons and equipment only if the recipient of the
information is in a position to take advantage of it in this war.(44)
In practice this directive, which was implemented with the
consent of FDR, was interpreted very strictly by the Americans, who stopped most
information going to the British teams that had done much of the early work on nuclear
fission. Despite the fact that this was a major concern to Churchill, who had taken a
strong interest in the project, and who had been an early advocate of full sharing of
technology, there is no indication that he discussed it with FDR at Casablanca. While many
of their conversations were off the record, it seems likely that Churchill skirted the
issue, although he was to take it up directly in correspondence with FDR. This tells us
much about the personal relationship - that it was not necessarily effective at
resolving controversy, for this was undoubtedly a major disagreement between two allies,
and that Churchill was aware of its limitations for that purpose.
His response to the situation was to talk to Hopkins while at
SYMBOL - this is from a note he sent Hopkins after the conference:
That very secret matter … which you told me would be
put right as soon as the President got home? I should be very grateful for some news about
this.(45)
As with the Unconditional Surrender disagreements, this does
illustrate the value of the two leaders having good relations with each other's
aides. However, ultimately the matter casts the personal relationship as being limited in
some aspects, and the issue of co-operation over nuclear weapons as being one which was
most vexatious to alliance politics during late 1942 and the first half of 1943. As with
other disagreements, the two leaders were almost diametrically opposed, forced into
opposing positions by standing up for what they perceived to be their national interest
over the interests of the coalition of which they were a part. The special relationship
was demonstrated to be irrelevant when the interests and objectives of the alliance
partners seriously diverged, as happened over atomic weapons, a reminder of the
convenience element inherent in the politics of the Grand Alliance, and of the competition
and resentment that lay beneath the surface at many levels of co-operation.(46)
Notes 1.
Memorandum by the CCS, 21.1.43, 'The Bomber Offensive from the
United Kingdom', in FRUS, pp.781-782. Back
2. CHAR 23/10 -
W.P.(42) 580, 16.12.42, p.2. Back
3. Eaker diary
(Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.). Cited in FRUS editorial
note, pp.666-667. Back
4. Churchill (1950),
p.609. Back
5. Sir William Deakin,
quoted by Kimball in Blake and Louis (1993). Back
6. Meeting of Roosevelt
with the JCS, 15.1.43, JCS Minutes in FRUS, p.562. Back
7. Meeting of the CCS with
Roosevelt and Churchill, 18.1.43, CCS Minutes in FRUS, pp.627-637. Back
8. Further reading: for an
overview of the strategic bombing concept in theory and practice, see Frankland (1965),
and Overy (1980), Ch.3 (iv) and Ch.5; for an overview of the bombing issues debated at
Casablanca, see Hastings (1979), Ch.7. Back
9. For more detailed
figures for the period, see Keegan (1989)(2), p.88. Back
10. Meeting of Roosevelt
with the JCS, 15.1.43, JCS Minutes in FRUS, p.561. Back
11. Further reading:
Keegan (1988), Ch.4, for an account of the Battle of the Atlantic; Weinberg (1994), Ch.7,
for an overview of the naval situation from 1942-44 and the blockade of the UK; Smith
(1996), Ch.5, for an examination of the Anglo-US logistics diplomacy at Casablanca.
Back
12. Quoted in Keegan
(1989)(1), p.263 Back
13. PRO, CAB 80/67.
Back
14. Murphy (1964), p.211.
Back
15. By far the most
amusing account is that given by Jacob, who describes not the issues but the emotions they
provoked, and the way several meetings nearly erupted into violence. This is lost to us in
the minutes, which have been thoroughly sanitised. Back
16. Meeting of Roosevelt
and Churchill with the CCS, 18.1.43, CCS Minutes in FRUS, p.629. Back
17. Meeting of Roosevelt
and Churchill with the CCS, 18.1.43, CCS Minutes in FRUS, p.629. Back
18. See PRO, HW
1/1274-1330. Back
19. CHAR 20/127/1.
Back
20. Meeting of Roosevelt
and Churchill with the CCS, 18.1.43, CCS Minutes in FRUS, pp.627-636.
Back
21. Gilbert (1989)(1),
pp.311-312. Note signed 'FDR, WSC', 25.1.43: PRO, PREM 3/420/5.
Back
22. Further reading:
Bryant (1986), Ch.11 brings together the Brooke diaries and other primary sources to give
a good overview of the tensions and arguments. Back
23. JACB 1/20.
Back
24. Telegram STRATAGEM:
232: Churchill to Attlee, 25.1.43. Quoted in Howard (1972), p.261. Back
25. Further reading: for
a discussion of Churchill's attitude to Russia, see Lawlor in Langhorne (1985), and
Warner in Dockrill (1996); for a discussion of Churchill's relationship with Stalin,
see Edmonds in Blake and Louis (1996); see also Dallek (1974), Ch.14 on FDR and alliance
politics. Back
26. Meeting of Roosevelt
and Churchill with the CCS, 18.1.43, CCS Minutes in FRUS, pp.634. Back
27. On FDR, Churchill and
China, see Dallek (1974), Ch.14. Back
28. Transcript of Press
Conference, 24.1.43 in FRUS, p.727. Back
29. Editorial note for
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 23.1.43 in FRUS, p.704. Back
30. Minutes of the
meeting of the CCS with Roosevelt and Churchill, 18.1.43 in FRUS, p.635.
Back
31. Harriman (1976),
p.188. Back
32. FRUS, pp.726-731. Back
33. Further reading: for
more details, an assessment of the genesis of the policy in FDR's thinking, and its
consistency with previously stated war aims, see O'Connor (1971), especially Ch.3;
for a discussion of the policy's effects on the rest of the war see Campbell in
Langhorne (1985). Back
34. By this time the Free
French movement had been renamed as the Fighting French. The change of name never stuck
and most people referred to them as the Free French throughout the war.
Back
35. Murphy (1964), p.165.
Back
36. Kimball (1984),
C-249. Back
37. E.Roosevelt (1946),
p.99. Back
38. CHAR 20/127/1.
Back
39. Rhodes-James (1974.),
VI, p.6693. Back
40. E.Roosevelt (1946),
pp.36-7. Back
41. Editorial note for
Roosevelt dinner party, 22.1.43 in FRUS, pp.692-3. Back
42. Editorial note for
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 20.1.43, in FRUS, p.662. Henry Stimson, the US
Secretary of War, who was not present at the conference, recounted the comment as part of
an anecdote in a diary entry for 3.2.43 (Stimson Papers). Back
43. Further reading: on
the Darlan deal and the effect of the assassination, see Hurstfield (1986), Chs 8 & 9;
on the de Gaulle - Giraud controversy, see Kersaudy (1981), Ch.10; for an overview of
America and colonialism, see Louis (1997), Ch.6. Back
44. Anderson to
Churchill, in PREM 3/139/8A. Back
45. Churchill to Hopkins,
letter dated 16.1.1943, PRO, PREM 3/139/8A. Back
46., Further reading: for
the full British correspondence, see PRO, PREM 3/139/8A. See also Sherwin (1975), Ch.3;
for a good summary of the controversy and the issues involved, see Gowing (1964), Ch.5.
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