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Chapter 4
The personal
relationship between FDR and Churchill was undoubtedly crucial to determining the outcome
of SYMBOL. In terms of diplomacy and foreign relations it was a summit conference between
two men who could (and did) argue with each other on issues like the French situation from
a position of understanding and trust (relative to normal relationships between world
leaders). The predilection of both men for personal diplomacy only served to enhance this.
In terms of the military discussions, the two men were not essential to CCS deliberations
- however, having them both present as arbiters of their countries' policies
undoubtedly saved time later, especially given Churchill's view of his own strategic
abilities. Without the two war leaders, it is
extremely unlikely that the French situation would have been resolved so quickly (if
resolved it was), while the policy of Unconditional Surrender was simply a unique product
of having the two men in the same place at the same time. Predictably, the whole
conference is suffused with the personalities and policies of its two principals. In a
message to the absent Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, Churchill wrote 'The President
dined with me last night and inspected the Map Room. He is in great form and we have never
been so close,'(1) just one of many pieces of anecdotal
evidence that points to the strength of their working relationship, whatever the
disagreements over policy they may have had. At the highest level, their meeting shaped
the whole course of the war in 1943, subsequent meetings only serving to follow the
strategic signposts already laid out by Casablanca (although we should not forget there
were many other levels of military planning of equal influence). Other relationships were
to play their part in determining the outcome of the conference, such as the
Murphy-Macmillan partnership, and the ability of Dill to act as a broker in CCS
deliberations, while obviously, the military outcomes of the conference could not have
been reached without the CCS.
There were issues that were bound to be hotly debated when
the two men arrived at the conference, as well as those that were likely to be
non-controversial. Roosevelt felt strongly about China; he was strongly opposed to de
Gaulle; crucially, he was also firmly looking to a new post-war world order which held no
place for imperialism, a view confirmed by his visit to British West African possessions
on his way to Casablanca. He left strategic matters to Marshall, and had little apparent
interest in the CBO; however, he was deeply concerned by the Battle of the Atlantic and
the ramifications of logistics issues. Most importantly, he was also deeply concerned
about Stalin's resolve, hence his unscripted announcement of the policy of
Unconditional Surrender. Churchill felt strongly about almost every issue under
discussion! The CBO and Grand Strategy exercised his delight in debating strategy, while
his concern over the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic is well documented. Turkey was
his 'pet project' at the time, and his feelings on the imperialism issue and the
Free French situation were as emphatic as usual - he did not intend to let FDR
strong-arm him into renouncing the concept of European imperialism, even though they were
meeting in a French imperial possession liberated by Americans. The unspoken backdrop to
all this was an ongoing dispute between the two sides over the future of co-operation in
the attempt to create a nuclear bomb, in which Churchill elected to pursue the matter with
Harry Hopkins rather than take it up personally with FDR.
Both leaders were dependent to a certain extent on advisors.
On military matters, FDR relied more heavily on Marshall than Churchill did on his COS.
Diplomatically, both were their own men, with Hopkins, Harriman, Macmillan and Murphy only
enjoying a limited amount of autonomy to resolve the French impasse. General Somervell and
Lord Leathers appear to have had more leeway in resolving the logistics issues raised for
the coming year. The diplomatic resolutions reached at Casablanca, though, were very much
the result of the personal war-leader diplomacy of which both men were so fond.
Despite the raft of problems facing them at the start of the
conference, both men were personally confident of the strength of their personal
relationship, and of its utility in settling disputes about how to conduct the war. Though
each was aware of potentially troublesome issues, they did not allow this to interfere
with an essential optimism (although there was a real recognition that the problems,
especially military, were serious ones). Churchill was not so confident that he did not
urge his staff to plan rigorously for the event, in the event a decisive factor in the
military deliberations. Each leader and their staff attached different importance to some
issues, hence the variety of debates and disagreements - ultimately, though, the
leaders did hope to find a common way, despite the impression that British planning might
have given to the contrary.
The Casablanca conference was a positive experience for both
war leaders, despite some disagreements and the last-minute surprise announcement of
Unconditional Surrender, which Churchill claimed caught him totally unawares. SYMBOL laid
the basis for strong Anglo-American co-operation in 1943, with a number of subsequent
conferences that embellished the themes laid out there, such as the invasion of Italy
following on from HUSKY. It also established strong precedents for unity of purpose as a
vital element of allied policy.
1943 was in many ways the heyday of the personal
relationship, which began to deteriorate once Stalin and Roosevelt finally put their heads
together as Teheran. FDR was so convinced that he could get through to Stalin that he was
prepared to sacrifice his good relationship with Churchill to do so. That period in the
history of United Nations alliance politics, which were dark days from the point of view
of Churchill's influence, make the co-operation and good-natured impression we get of
Casablanca seem like something of a high-point in the relationship, coming as it also does
at the start of the allied successes that were to become a feature of the second half of
the war. The conference was fundamentally a product of the 'special
relationship' between Churchill and Roosevelt, which also strengthened it. Unlike
previous conferences, which had been set against British reverses such as the fall of
Tobruk, SYMBOL, held in territory gained by allied force of arms, was a fundamentally
positive experience for both men, which should be remembered as two things: the conference
where Unconditional Surrender was announced, and the first conference which looked in
concrete terms to the future of the colonies in the post-war world.
The positive tone of the conference was captured by FDR in a
telegram to King George summarising the progress that they had made at Casablanca, which
conveys the sense of purpose that infused the participants at SYMBOL, and the genuine
warmth that existed between the two main protagonists:
As for Mr Churchill and myself, I need not tell you that we
make a perfectly matched team in harness and out - and incidentally had lots of fun
together as we always do. Our studies and our unanimous agreements must and will bear
fruit.(2)
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Notes
1. Telegram from Churchill
to Eden, dated 22.1.43, in CHAR 20/127/1. Back
2. Telegram from Roosevelt
to King George VI in CHAR 20/127/1. Back
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