SYMBOL - The Casablanca Conference Churchill, Roosevelt and the Casablanca Conference
SYMBOL - The Casablanca Conference By Simon Appleby

 

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Introduction and a Note on the Sources

NB: I have included all the footnotes from the original study in this web-site. Click on the numbered links in the body text, e.g. 13, to be be taken to the note, and when you have read the footnote, click Back to return to your place in the text.

A single volume study of the Casablanca Conference has not yet been written. Much scholarship has been devoted to the later conferences at Teheran and Yalta, where Stalin's presence and the certainty of Hitler's defeat made for lively debate and greater consideration of post-war issues, issues which take on greater importance in the light of the Cold War (1). Casablanca was the first of the 1943 conferences, of which there were seven in all (2). While there is no single-volume history, few historians of the war leaders or of their generals do not consider the conference. Warren Kimball, with his recently published Forged in War has produced an excellent summary of the conference in terms of the personal relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill, and this should be considered one of the best secondary accounts, while John Keegan also devotes his attention to its import, providing a good account from the military perspective as part of what is possibly the best single-volume account of the war (3).

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the significance of the personal relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt, the so-called "special relationship", to the outcome of Casablanca. Did it affect the outcome of discussions? Was it a decisive or a divisive factor? Was it crucial to determining the outcome of the conference, or would the decisions have been the same without the two men? Were other relationships more important to reaching a resolution of a significant division between the JCS and their counterparts on the COS?

Arguably Casablanca was the first summit conference at which post-war issues were considered in a concrete way - the Atlantic conference considered them in hypothetical and idealist fashion. Rather than Eastern Europe, though, the territories under consideration in 1943 were the colonies of the Old World. The most important event for which it is now remembered is the policy of Unconditional Surrender, still mired in controversy. An important feature at the time was the resolution of the internal wrangling that beset liberated French territories in North Africa, an issue which, as we shall see, was inextricably bound up with the future of colonialism. Militarily, it was unremarkable except for what it failed to do, that is, produce any decision to open a true Second Front in Europe in 1943. The most significant military decision was that taken to invade Sicily (HUSKY), which Keegan believes was decisive in committing the Allies to a Mediterranean strategy. The logical next step from HUSKY was the invasion of Italy, and it is arguable that the invasion of Southern France which followed D-Day, DRAGOON, was also a result of invading Sicily (4).

Chapter 1 is a summary of the Anglo-American relationship, and the personal relationship, from the outbreak of war in September 1939 until the end of 1942, immediately before the conference. Chapter 2 is an overview of the conference itself, examining the immediate context of the meeting. It also considers the attitudes of those involved, and the surprisingly crucial aspect of differing conference preparations. Chapter 3, which in many ways of the crux of this study, contains summaries of all of the main issues under discussion, the effect of the personal relationship upon them, and what their handling can tell us about the personal relationship. Chapter 4 considers the fate of the relationship at future wartime conference provides an evaluation of the facts that have been presented, and draws conclusions.

A Note on the Sources

Three types of source have been used in this study: firstly, primary sources, especially the recollections of many of the participants, written either during the conference or after the war; secondly, the official records taken by both the British and American contingents; thirdly, secondary works devoted to examining in greater depth the many issues that were raised at Casablanca.

Memoirs vary in quality and lucidity on the details of the conference, but there are few major participants who did not commit their thoughts to paper about the war (Roosevelt himself, who died in 1945, is of course the vital exception - for his attitude we must turn to his correspondence and the recollections of those around him). Elliott Roosevelt provides his own account of many wartime conferences in As He Saw It, but he should be considered less than completely reliable, owing to a desire to justify his recently-dead father's policies, and repudiate Churchill, who, with FDR dead, was able to write the history of the war from his own inimitable perspective with less fear of contradiction. Sherwood provides a useful account based heavily on the papers of Harry Hopkins. Averell Harriman has also written of his experiences. Of the military men, Ismay and others have been published. Macmillan and Murphy both provide accounts of their part in resolving the French impasse, Murphy through memoirs, Macmillan through (self) published diaries. Sadly, we are deprived of the thoughts of Brigadier Vivian Dykes, a vital spoke in the Anglo-American wheel - he died in a plane crash while returning from the conference, and his diary stops two months short of events at Casablanca. Lastly, there is Churchill's epic six-volume account, The Second World War, which while purporting to be history, is in truth a personal account and a significant piece of self-justification, using the documents sent and received by Churchill during the war.

The volume of FRUS devoted to the Washington and Casablanca conferences is invaluable. It contains the President's Log, as recorded by his aides, and the broader Proceedings of the Conference, which includes the minutes of all meetings involving the Americans. It also contains the main documents produced during the deliberations, as well as a variety of pre-conference materials. Excellent editorial notes provide details of un-minuted meetings as available from other sources.

A number of unpublished sources have been consulted while writing this study. A vital insight into the organisation behind the conference, and a lower level perspective of it, is provided by the diaries of Colonel Ian Jacob: he was sent out beforehand to expedite arrangements and was a vital part of the secretariat during its running. These diaries are still little known, having only been made available at the Churchill Archive Centre in 1993. For meetings that did not involve the American delegation, it has been necessary to visit the Public Record Office in Kew: CAB 99/24 is the British Proceedings of the Conference, and there is also relevant material in the Premier Papers series. The Churchill Archive Centre has also yielded some useful background material, including War Directives circulated by Churchill in the build-up to the conference and the volume of telegrams he sent during his time at Casablanca. In order to gain a picture of the course of the conference, I created a chart, using material from FRUS and the PRO; this shows the dates of all significant meetings at the conference, who was present, and which issues were discussed. This had been included in this study as the Appendix [not yet included in on-line version].

There are many secondary works that have been consulted during the course of this study: on the Anglo-American alliance, on the Soviet dimension, on the personal relationship, on the different conferences, and on the variety of issues raised at Casablanca. A full list of all relevant secondary works can be found in the Bibliography. In addition, bibliographic footnotes will draw the reader's attention to books and articles of particular interest and merit regarding the topics under discussion.

Abbreviations

CBO Combined Bomber Offensive
CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff, the supreme strategy-making committee of the Allied military
CHAR The Chartwell Papers, covering Churchill’s life up to 1945, held at the Churchill Archive Centre, Cambridge
COS Chiefs of Staff committee, the British heads of the armed services
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States, collections of documents on US foreign policy published by the State Department
HMG His Majesty’s Government
JACB The papers of Colonel Ian Jacob, held at the Churchill Archive Centre
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the American heads of the armed services
PRO Public Record Office

Codenames for military operations are in capitals (e.g. ANAKIM). Footnotes use the author / date system. See the Bibliography for details of cited works.

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Notes

1. On the Moscow and Teheran conferences, Sainsbury (1985); on Yalta, Clemens (1970). Back

2. Washington (TRIDENT), May 12-27, 1943; Quebec (QUADRANT); Moscow foreign ministers’ conference, October 18-November 1; Cairo (SEXTANT), November 23-26 (FDR, Churchill, Chiang Kai-Shek); Teheran (EUREKA), November 28-December 1 (FDR, Churchill, Stalin); second Cairo, December 4-6 (Churchill, FDR, Ismet Inonu, Turkish President). Yalta (ARGONAUT) was February 4-11, 1945. For a complete list of all significant wartime conferences, their participants and outcomes go to Documents and ResourcesBack

3. Kimball (1997), Ch.6; Keegan (1989)(1), pp.262-4, 354-5.Back

4. Keegan (1989)(1), pp.263-4.Back